Equity - Private Hospitals - Court Will Order Private Hospital to Review Application of Qualified Osteopath by DeSantis, Conrad J.
Volume 9 Issue 1 Article 12 
1963 
Equity - Private Hospitals - Court Will Order Private Hospital to 
Review Application of Qualified Osteopath 
Conrad J. DeSantis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Medical Jurisprudence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Conrad J. DeSantis, Equity - Private Hospitals - Court Will Order Private Hospital to Review Application of 
Qualified Osteopath, 9 Vill. L. Rev. 149 (1963). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol9/iss1/12 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
certain expenses beyond the initial cost of production. An allowance for
this is added into the purchase price. If a seller wishes to limit or to
eliminate such liability entirely he has other avenues open to him.2 5
Additional safeguards are available to the seller in the form of dis-
claimers of warranty liability and the like. Sections such as 2-718, 2-719
and the comments thereto suggest solutions which most sellers are normally
willing to make voluntarily. 26 These safeguards, then, from the seller's
point of view, and the remedies available to the buyer in cases of the
seller's breach, make the fears of the court unfounded. The result therein
obtained would have been good law prior to the Code. As it is, it violates
certainly the spirit of the Code and the goals which have been set for it.
It is a step backward for the effectiveness of the Code and for the "uniformly
correct construction" of it.
Robert Mickler
EQUITY-PRIVATE HOSPITALS-COURT WILL ORDER PRIVATE HOSPITAL
To REVIEW APPLICATION OF QUALIFIED OSTEOPATH.
Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp. (N.J. 1963)
The plaintiff, a graduate of the Philadelphia College of Osteopathy,'
was fully licensed to practice medicine and surgery by the State Board of
Examiners. However, in accordance with bylaws requiring membership
in the county medical society and graduation from a medical school which
is approved by the American Medical Society, the defendant, Newcomb
25. While the seller's alternatives are unimportant to the instant case it will
perhaps be useful to touch briefly on the subject. A useful discussion of the pertinent
sections, comparing them with prior law on the subject of liquidated damages appears
in 31 FORDHAM L. Rv. 749, 763 (1963). Its analysis of the Code's provisions are
valid for Pennsylvania as well.
The Code validates a liquidated damage clause if, among other things, it is
"reasonable in the light of anticipated or actual harm .. " The comments to
this section speak of what is "reasonable in the light of the circumstances" and
thus a liquidated damage clause unreasonable by the "anticipated harm" test,
nay now be validated if reasonable in view of the actual loss. This is a logical
result. If a contract contains a damage clause so large that it is unreasonable in
light of the anticipated loss, it must be presumed that the risk of such a forfeiture
was well considered and compensated for in the consideration sought in return.
[Thus answering the Globe theory that one ought not be allowed to obtain an
advantage for which he has not paid.] This argument clearly has far more
validity than the similar one usually given in support of the "contemplation" test,
for in the case of a liquidated damage clause an attempt has in fact been made
to assess losses. Thus when the actual loss is found to be commensurate with the
previously unreasonable estimate, the liquidation clause should not be disposed
of as a "penalty."
26. 30 TEMP. L.Q. 47 (1956). This article deals specifically with the procedural
aspects of such limitations and disclaimers, but is a useful source of information on
the solutions in actual operation.
1. Philadelphia College of Osteopathy, like all other schools of osteopathy, was
not approved by the American Medical Association (AMA).
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Hospital, rejected without consideration plaintiff's application for member-
ship to its courtesy medical staff. Newcomb was the only hospital
in the metropolitan area of Vineland, which included Newfield, where
plaintiff was the only licensed physician. Plaintiff brought an action alleg-
ing that the preliminary requirements specified in the hospital bylaws were
arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, and void as against public policy of
the State and operated to cause plaintiff severe economic loss and profes-
sional embarrassment. The defendant, a private nonprofit corporation
governed by a Board of Trustees, denied the allegations and further con-
tended that because of the private nature of the hospital, exclusion of a
physician was within its discretion and as such afforded no legal basis for
judicial interference.
After finding that the injury suffered by the plaintiff as a result of
his exclusion from the only hospital in the area justified judicial scrutiny,
the court held: (1) the bylaw requiring membership in the county medical
society, as a preliminary qualification, was void per se as contrary to public
policy, (2) the bylaw requiring graduation from a medical school approved
by the AMA, in so far as it applied to the plaintiff, against public policy
2
and directed the defendant to reconsider plaintiff's application. Greisman
v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963).
The American traditions of liberty and independence helped to develop
an early policy of maximum autonomy toward private organizations. Not
until the growth of private associations increasingly affected the lives of
individuals was this policy questioned. The great control which labor unions,
trade and professional associations acquired over access to jobs and eco-
nomic opportunities caused the courts to review this autonomy.
Faced with initial problems of jurisdiction and what body of law to
apply, the courts turned to common law principles of property, -contracts,
torts and, more recently, to fiduciary theories. Under the property doctrine
the courts took jurisdiction of a controversy to protect a member's prop-
erty interest in the association. Any pecuniary interest a member has in
association property such as the physical property or an organization's
assets suffices. This doctrine has developed into a mechanical test, but its
usefulness is questionable in light of the fictional nature of the property
interest on which courts have relied.3 The contract theory emphasizes the
enforcement of an association's rules as contractual obligations between an
association and its members. The major fault of this doctrine is that it
provides no relief to a nonmember 4 or a member unjustly excluded but in
compliance with the rules.
The courts, attempting to make these doctrines more flexible, have
found implied trusts to exist where group action diverts property or power
2. Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963).
3. State ex rel. Waring v. Georgia Medical Socy, 38 Ga. 608, 626 (1869) (in-
terest in corporate franchise) ; Halcombe v. Leavitt, 124 N.Y. Supp. 980 (Sup. Ct.
1910) (opportunity to become trustee of church) ; Williams v. District Exec. Bd.,
UMW, 1 Pa. D.&C. 31 (Lackawanna C.P. 1921) (chance of election to salaried
position in an association).
4. Elizabeth Hosp., Inc. v. Richardson, 167 F. Supp. 155 (W.D. Ark. 1958).
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from the purpose for which it was intended. The officers of the association
are regarded as trustees5 acting on behalf of the members or the general
public. The fiduciary doctrine has most often been applied to organizations
involved in areas that are regulated by statutes.6 Labor unions were first
held to have a fiduciary obligation not only to their members but also to
nonmembers.7 Industry-wide closed shop rules necessitated such judicial
intervention.
Prior to this decision, judicial interference in a private hospital's
affairs was virtually nil. There have been cases in which courts interpreted
hospital bylaws8 or ordered enforcement of a bylaw requiring particular
procedure before expulsion of a practitioner.9 But as a general rule, unless
government had a direct voice in the management and control of a hos-
pital,10 and even in cases in which a hospital received funds from the gov-
ernment, a private corporation engaged in charitable work is considered
a private institution" and courts ". . . will not interfere with internal
management of a private corporation. Questions of policy and management
are left solely to the honest decisions of the officers and directors, and the
court is without authority to substitute its judgment for theirs.' 12
The rule prior to the instant case was that a private hospital could
"exclude any physician from practicing therein, and such exclusion rests
within sound discretion of managing authorities."' 8 The court was careful
to differentiate numerous decisions pertaining to public hospitals14 where
5. Local 1140, United Elec. Workers v. United. Elec. Workers, 232 Minn. 217,
45 N.W.2d 408 (1950).
6. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, § 501 (a), 73 Stat.
535 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 501(a) (Supp. III, 1962).
7. See, e.g., Crowell v. Palmer, 134 Conn. 502, 58 A.2d 729 (1948).
8. Joseph v. Passaic Hosp. Ass'n, 26 N.J. 557, 141 A.2d 18 (1958).
9. Berberian v. Lancaster Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n,. Inc., 395 Pa. 257, 149 A.2d
456 (1959).
10. Eaton v. Bd. of Managers of James Walker Memorial Hosp., 164 F. Supp.
191 (E.D.N.C. 1958), aff'd, 261 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984,
79 S.Ct. 941 (1959).
11. Van Campen v. Olean Gen. Hosp., 210 App. Div. 204, 205 N.Y. Supp. 554
(1924), aff'd per curiam, 239 N.Y. 615, 147 N.E. 219 (1925).
12. Edson v. Griffin Hosp., 21 Conn. Supp. 55, 59, 144 A.2d 341, 344 (1958).
Note that in this case, the hospital would have lost its accreditation which makes it
impossible to obtain interns and nursing students.
13. Levin v. Sinai Hosp., 186 Md. 174, 179-80, 46 A.2d 298, 301 (Ct. App. 1946);
Natale v. Sisters of Mercy, 243 Iowa 582, 52 N.W.2d 701 (1952). In these cases, the
courts speak of rights and interests which would indicate consideration of property
and contract theories, and this explains why the court would not interfere with an
exclusion. The theories were too limited and did not allow judicial intervention in
cases brought by nonmembers.
14. Public hospitals have been described as "instrumentalities of the state, founded
and owned by it in the public interest, supported by public funds, and governed by
managers deriving their authority from the state." Van Campen v. Olean General
Hosp., 210 App. Div. 204, 205, 205 N.Y. Supp. 554, 555 (1924), aff'd per curiam,
239 N.Y. 615, 147 N.E. 219 (Ct. App. 1925). This is in contrast with a private
hospital which is "one founded and maintained by private persons or a corporation,
the state or municipality having no voice in the management or control of its property
or the formation of rules for its government." Edson v. Griffin Hosp., 21 Conn.
Supp. 55, 58, 144 A.2d 341, 343 (1958). The criterion for the distinction is not
whether the hospital receives public aid, Eaton v. Bd. of Managers of James Walker
3
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judicial interference has been substantial. 15 The Supreme Court of the
United States in Hayman v. Galveston16 held that there was no constitu-
tional right to the use of facilities of a public hospital, but only a privilege
granted or refused in accordance with rules formulated by hospital au-
thorities. The rules have to be reasonable and not arbitrary, and these
standards have been applied to the rules of private hospitals as well as
public. In Hamilton County Hosp. v. Andrews,17 plaintiff sought relief
from a hospital rule which required, as a preliminary qualification, member-
ship in the county medical society. The court held that the plaintiff failed to
show that the rule was "unreasonable and arbitrary." However, in a
similar case,'8 where membership in the county medical society was a con-
dition precedent to admission to the hospital staff, the court held that the
requirement was an invalid delegation of hospital authority since, in effect,
the county medical society was determining who was qualified to be on the
staff. The court felt that there was an insufficient relationship between
membership in the medical society and the public interest in maintaining
high standards of practice in the hospitals to justify such delegation.
There are few cases dealing with admission to medical societies; the
general rule seems to be that membership is determined solely by the
society, and the courts will not interfere, even if exclusion is arbitrary.19
However, the Superior Court of New Jersey in Falcone v. Middlesex
County Medical Society20 took the necessary step forward stating the
following position: "the court will grant relief, providing that such exclu-
sion was contrary to the organization's own laws, was without procedural
safeguards, or the application of a particular law or laws of an organization
was contrary to public policy.''2' In affirming the lower court's decision,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey broadened the holding by pointing out
that an "individual's opportunity of earning a livelihood and serving society
in his chosen trade or profession appeared as the controlling policy con-
Memorial Hosp., 164 F. Supp. 191 (E.D.N.C. 1958), aff'd, 261 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984, 79 S.Ct. 941 (1959), but whether government has
direct control in its management and control.
15. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Martin, 20 N.J. Super. 531, 90 A.2d 151 (Ch. 1952)
Alpert v. Bd. of Governors of City Hosp., 286 App. Div. 542, 145 N.Y.S.2d 534
(App. Div. 1955); Group Health Cooperative v. King County Medical Soc'y, 39
Wash. 2d 586, 237 P.2d 737 (1951) ; Ware v. Benedikt, 225 Ark. 185, 280 S.W.2d 234
(1955); Hamilton County Hosp. v. Andrews, 227 Ind. 217, 84 N.E.2d 469 (1949),
aff'd. 85 N.E.2d 365 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 831, 70 S.Ct. 73 (1949) ; Stribling
v. Jolley, 241 Mo. App. 1123, 253 S.W.2d 519 (1952).
16. 273 U.S. 414, 47 S.Ct. 363 (1927). This case is a good example of past legal
thinking on this point. However, in the light of the Supreme Court's attitude today,
its strength as a precedent is questionable.
17. 81 N.E.2d 699 (Ind. App. 1948).
18. Ware v. Benedikt, 255 Ark. 185, 280 S.W.2d 234 (1955).
19. See Medical Soc'y v. Walker, 245 Ala. 135, 16 So. 2d 321 (1944) ; Ware v.
Benedikt, supra note 18; Hamilton County Hosp. v. Andrews, 227 Ind. 217, 84
N.E.2d 469, aff'd, 85 N.E.2d 365 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 831, 70 S.Ct. 73 (1949).
20. 62 N.J. Super. 184, 162 A.2d 324 (1960). For a comprehensive article on this
area see Note, Expulsion and Exclusion From Hospital Practice and Organized
Medical Societies, 15 RUTGERS L. Riv. 327 (1961).
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sideration. ' ' 22 The court went on to say, "In a case presenting sufficient
compelling factual and policy considerations, judicial relief will be available
to compel admission to membership. '23
In Falcone, the county medical society possessed a virtual monopoly
over the use of hospital facilities. Therefore, when the society excluded
the plaintiff, an osteopath, because of an unwritten rule requiring four
years attendance at an AMA approved school, it seriously restricted his
professional endeavors and caused him economic loss.2 4 The court said
public policy would not permit such power to prevail unsupervised. Instead,
courts should scrutinize this "fiduciary power" and determine if it is exer-
cised in a reasonable and lawful manner to advance the interests of the
medical profession and the public.
Along with the Falcone case, several significant events distinctly
affected the setting in which the Greisman case was to appear. First, the
American Hospital Association announced hospitals having Doctors of
Osteopathy would be listed; second, the Joint Commission on Accreditation
of Hospitals announced such hospitals were also qualified for accredita-
tion ;25 and third, the Judicial Council of the American Medical Association
adopted a policy which permitted members of medical societies to practice
with Doctors of Osteopathy. Also, the Judicial Council of New Jersey
adopted a resolution making it ethical for its members to associate with
any fully licensed physician who adheres to sound scientific principles.
In view of Falcone, the decision in this case was inevitable once the
court decided it had the right to interfere. Newcomb Hospital had a virtual
monopoly in the Vineland area and vitally affected the public interest. The
court justified interference in a private organization by showing that from
early common law days, courts have been willing to regulate private busi-
ness and professions for the public good.2 6 It noted that this policy has
continued in areas where private property or business is devoted "to a
public use,"'27 or is "affected with a public interest. '28
22. Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 596, 170 A.2d 791,
799 (1961) ; 7 VILL. L. Rev. 150 (1961).
23. Ibid.
24. A physician deprived of membership in a medical society is injured not only
because he is unable to use the facilities of many hospitals which require such
admission, but also because exclusion limits his professional contacts which are neces-
sary for patient referrals and consultations, a major means of expanding his practice.
As a member of a medical society, a doctor receives the latest scientific information
through medical journals, group malpractice insurance or legal advice, and, in the
larger societies, bill collection agencies. All of these services are available to mem-
bers at substantial savings. A doctor excluded from a society also misses the oppor-
tunity to discuss and exchange ideas with other men in his profession. For a detailed
study of the AMA and its local subsidiaries, see Note, The American Medical Associa-
tion: Power, Purpose, and Politics in Organized Medicine, 63 YALE L.J. 938 (1954).
25. Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, Bulletin No. 25, p. 2 (1960).
26. Reference here is made to traditional common law provisions on innkeepers,
carriers, farriers, and the like.
27. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 130 (1877).
28. German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 406, 34 S.Ct. 612, 617
(1914) ; see, Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 536-37, 54 S.Ct. 504, 516 (1934);
Amodio v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 133 N.J.L. 220, 224, 43 A.2d 889, 892 (Super. Ct. 1945).
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Taking this thread of policy, the court applied the test given in
Falcone. It determined that the monopolistic power which Newcomb
Hospital used to exclude Dr. Greisman and which jeopardized him in his
chosen profession was contrary to public policy. This power, denominated
as "fiduciary in nature," required that it be exercised reasonably and for the
public good. The court limited its decision strictly to the validity of the
bylaws, and because of this, it is questionable how useful it was or will
be in "bridling" the fiduciary power. The decision does help to eliminate
unwarranted discrimination on a class basis. Judicially, it has created a
means of spanning the gap between the AMA and osteopathy which from
all indications is perpetuated by a tradition of prejudice and by groups with
vested interests, rather than a conflict of ideology or scientific method.2 9
Hasn't the legislature, by licensing osteopaths to practice medicine,
given the courts the answer to the issue presented in this case? Or have
they simply set minimum standards required to practice in the state? Has
the legislature, by licensing the osteopaths, made it unlawful for a hospital
to refuse a licensed doctor? Surely the answer to these questions is that
the legislature has only established a minimum standard and has indicated
no policy which would require a hospital to accept this minimum. The
Greisman court realizes this and makes it clear that the solution of each
case will depend upon its fact situation. It states that its ruling is not a
policy decision, but a judicial determination insofar as it applies to the
plaintiff. While the court verbally limits its holding to the denunciation of
an arbitrary bylaw requiring exclusion without consideration, it is apparent
that the case states a broader proposition. Private organizations can no
longer be considered strictly private if they have a substantial influence
upon public welfare. When an organization's activities have this effect,
judicial intervention will not depend upon property, contract or tort theories,
but upon the courts power to enforce fiduciary obligations. The major
determinations thus become: does a fiduciary obligation exist, if so, is it
breached.
The court has apparently recognized what Chafee called the "strangle
hold policy."30 When an association is in such a position that membership
in it is necessary to earning a livelihood in a trade or profession, it is said
to have a strangle hold. Courts have in the past not been unwilling to
break this power when unjustly practiced by labor unions, and now other
associations are beginning to be similarly restricted. There is little doubt
that the defendant had a stranglehold here, but whether the court would
have reached the same decision had there been a hospital willing to accept
the plaintiff, is another question.
29. See generally Note, The American Medical Association: Power, Purpose and
Politics in Organized Medicine, 63 YAL L.J. 938, 966-67; Note, State Recognition
of Doctors of Osteopathy Compared with State Recognition of Doctors of Medicine,
31 No'rRn DAMp LAW. 286 (1956).
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